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Phaedo; Or, The Immortality Of The Soul, a non-fiction book by Plato |
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_ 43. "And must not to be separated and commingled, to grow cold and to grow warm, and every thing in the same manner, even though sometimes we have not names to designate them, yet in fact be everywhere thus circumstanced, of necessity, as to be produced from each other, and be subject to a reciprocal generation?" "Certainly," he replied. "What, then?" said Socrates, "has life any contrary, as waking has its contrary, sleeping?" "Certainly," he answered. "What?" "Death," he replied. "Are not these, then, produced from each other, since they are contraries; and are not the modes by which they are produced two-fold intervening between these two?" "How should it be otherwise?" "I then," continued Socrates, "will describe to you one pair of the contraries which I have just now mentioned, both what it is and its mode of production: and do you describe to me the other. I say that one is to sleep, the other to awake; and from sleeping awaking is produced, and from awaking sleeping, and that the modes of their production are, the one to fall asleep, the other to be roused. 44. Have I sufficiently explained this to you or not?" "Certainly." "Do you, then," he said, "describe to me in the same manner with respect to life and death? Do you not say that life is contrary to death?" "I do." "And that they are produced from each other?" "Yes." "What, then, is produced from life?" "Death," he replied. "What, then," said he "is produced from death?" "I must needs confess," he replied, "that life is." "From the dead, then, O Cebes! living things and living men are produced." "It appears so," he said. "Our souls, therefore," said Socrates, "exist in Hades." "So it seems." "With respect, then, to their mode of production, is not one of them very clear? for to die surely is clear, is it not?" "Certainly," he replied. "What, then, shall we do?" he continued; "shall we not find a corresponding contrary mode of production, or will nature be defective in this? Or must we discover a contrary mode of production to dying?" "By all means," he said. "What is this?" "To revive." "Therefore," he proceeded, "if there is such a thing as to revive, will not this reviving be a mode of production from the dead to the living?" "Certainly." "Thus, then, we have agreed that the living are produced from the dead, no less than the dead from the living; but, this being the case, there appears to me sufficient proof that the souls of the dead must necessarily exist somewhere, from whence they are again produced." 45. "It appears to me, Socrates," he said "that this must necessarily follow from what has been admitted." "See now, O Cebes!" he said, "that we have not agreed on these things improperly, as it appears to me; for if one class of things were not constantly given back in the place of another, revolving, as it were, in a circle, but generation were direct from one thing alone into its opposite, and did not turn round again to the other, or retrace its course, do you know that all things would at length have the same form, be in the same state, and cease to be produced?" "How say you?" he asked. "It is by no means difficult," he replied, "to understand what I mean; if, for instance, there should be such a thing as falling asleep, but no reciprocal waking again produced from a state of sleep, you know that at length all things would show the fable of Endymion to be a jest, and it would be thought nothing at all of, because everything else would be in the same state as he--namely, asleep. And if all things were mingled together, but never separated, that doctrine of Anaxagoras would soon be verified, 'all things would be together.' 46. Likewise, my dear Cebes, if all things that partake of life should die, and after they are dead should remain in this state of death, and not revive again, would it not necessarily follow that at length all things should be dead, and nothing alive? For if living beings are produced from other things, and living beings die, what could prevent their being all absorbed in death?" "Nothing whatever, I think, Socrates," replied Cebes; "but you appear to me to speak the exact truth." "For, Cebes," he continued, "as it seems to me, such undoubtedly is the case, and we have not admitted these things under a delusion, for it is in reality true that there is a reviving again, that the living are produced from the dead, that the souls of the dead exist, and that the condition of the good is better, and of the evil worse." 47. "And, indeed," said Cebes, interrupting him, "according to that doctrine, Socrates, which you are frequently in the habit of advancing, if it is true, that our learning is nothing else than reminiscence, according to this it is surely necessary that we must at some former time have learned what we now remember. But this is impossible, unless our soul existed somewhere before it came into this human form; so that from hence, also, the soul appears to be something immortal." "But, Cebes," said Simmias, interrupting him, "what proofs are there of these things? Remind me of them, for I do not very well remember them at present." 48. "It is proved," said Cebes, "by one argument, and that a most beautiful one, that men, when questioned (if one questions them properly) of themselves, describe all things as they are, however, if they had not innate knowledge and right reason, they would never be able to do this. Moreover, if one leads them to diagrams, or any thing else of the kind, it is then most clearly apparent that this is the case." "But if you are not persuaded in this way, Simmias," said Socrates, "see if you will agree with us in considering the matter thus. For do you doubt how that which is called learning is reminiscence?" "I do not doubt," said Simmias; "but I require this very thing of which we are speaking, to be reminded; and, indeed, from what Cebes has begun to say, I almost now remember, and am persuaded; nevertheless, however, I should like to hear now how you would attempt to prove it." "I do it thus" he replied: "we admit, surely, that if any one be reminded of any thing, he must needs have known that thing at some time or other before." "Certainly," he said. 49. "Do we, then, admit this also, that when knowledge comes in a certain manner it is reminiscence? But the manner I mean is this: if any one, upon seeing or hearing, or perceiving through the medium of any other sense, some particular thing, should not only know that, but also form an idea of something else, of which the knowledge is not the same, but different, should we not justly say that he remembered that of which he received the idea?" "How mean you?" "For instance, the knowledge of a man is different from that of a lyre." "How not?" "Do you not know, then, that lovers when they see a lyre, or a garment, or any thing else which their favorite is accustomed to use, are thus affected; they both recognize the lyre, and receive in their minds the form of the person to whom the lyre belonged? This is reminiscence: just as any one, seeing Simmias, is often reminded of Cebes, and so in an infinite number of similar instances." "An infinite number, indeed, by Jupiter!" said Simmias. "Is not, then," he said, "something of this sort a kind of reminiscence, especially when one is thus affected with respect to things which, from lapse of time, and not thinking of them, one has now forgotten?" "Certainly," he replied. 50. "But what?" he continued. "Does it happen that when one sees a painted horse or a painted lyre one is reminded of a man, and that when one sees a picture of Simmias one is reminded of Cebes?" "Certainly." "And does it not also happen that on seeing a picture of Simmias one is reminded of Simmias himself?" "It does, indeed," he replied. "Does it not happen, then, according to all this, that reminiscence arises partly from things like, and partly from things unlike?" "It does." "But when one is reminded by things like, is it not necessary that one should be thus further affected, so as to perceive whether, as regards likeness, this falls short or not of the thing of which one has been reminded?" "It is necessary," he replied. "Consider, then," said Socrates, "if the case is thus. Do we allow that there is such a thing as equality? I do not mean of one log with another, nor one stone with another, nor any thing else of this kind, but something altogether different from all these--abstract equality; do we allow that there is any such thing, or not?" "By Jupiter! we most assuredly do allow it," replied Simmias. 51. "And do we know what it is itself?" "Certainly," he replied. "Whence have we derived the knowledge of it? Is it not from the things we have just now mentioned, and that from seeing logs, or stones, or other things of the kind, equal, we have from these formed an idea of that which is different from these--for does it not appear to you to be different? Consider the matter thus. Do not stones that are equal, and logs sometimes that are the same, appear at one time equal, and at another not?" "Certainly." "But what? Does abstract equality ever appear to you unequal? or equality inequality?" "Never, Socrates, at any time." "These equal things, then," he said, "and abstract equality, are not the same?" "By no means, Socrates, as it appears." "However, from these equal things," he said, "which are different from that abstract equality, have you not formed your idea and derived your knowledge of it?" "You speak most truly," he replied. "Is it not, therefore, from its being like or unlike them?" "Certainly." "But it makes no difference," he said. "When, therefore, on seeing one thing, you form, from the sight of it, the notion of another, whether like or unlike, this," he said, "must necessarily be reminiscence." "Certainly." 52. "What, then, as to this?" he continued. "Are we affected in any such way with regard to logs and the equal things we have just now spoken of? And do they appear to us to be equal in the same manner as abstract equality itself is, or do they fall short in some degree, or not at all, of being such as equality itself is?" "They fall far short," he replied. "Do we admit, then, that when one, on beholding some particular thing, perceives that it aims, as that which I now see, at being like something else that exists, but falls short of it, and can not become such as that is, but is inferior to it--do we admit that he who perceives this must necessarily have had a previous knowledge of that which he says it resembles, though imperfectly?" "It is necessary." "What, then? Are we affected in some such way, or not, with respect to things equal and abstract equality itself?" "Assuredly." "It is necessary, therefore, that we must have known abstract equality before the time when, on first seeing equal things, we perceived that they all aimed at resembling equality, but failed in doing so." "Such is the case." 53. "Moreover, we admit this too, that we perceived this, and could not possibly perceive it by any other means than the sight, or touch, or some other of the senses, for I say the same of them all." "For they are the same, Socrates, so far as, our argument is concerned." "However, we must perceive, by means of the senses, that all things which come under the senses aim at that abstract equality, and yet fall short of it; or how shall we say it is?" "Even so." "Before, then, we began to see, and hear, and use our other senses, we must have had a knowledge of equality itself--what it is, if we were to refer to it those equal things that come under the senses, and observe that all such things aim at resembling that, but fall far short of it." "This necessarily follows, Socrates, from what has been already said." "But did we not, as soon as we were born, see and hear, and possess our other senses?" "Certainly." "But, we have said, before we possessed these, we must have had a knowledge of abstract equality?" "Yes." "We must have had it, then, as it seems, before we were born." "It seems so." 54. "If, therefore, having this before we were born, we were born possessing it, we knew, both before we were born and as soon as we were born, not only the equal and the greater and smaller, but all things of the kind; for our present discussion is not more respecting equality than the beautiful itself, the good, the just, and the holy, and, in one word, respecting every thing which we mark with the seal of existence, both in the questions we ask and the answers we give. So that we must necessarily have had a knowledge of all these before we were born." "Such is the case." "And if, having once had it, we did not constantly forget it, we should always be born with this knowledge, and should always retain it through life. For to know is this, when one has got a knowledge of any thing, to retain and not lose it; for do we not call this oblivion, Simmias, the loss of knowledge?" "Assuredly, Socrates," he replied. 55. "But if, having had it before we were born, we lose it at our birth, and afterward, through exercising the senses about these things, we recover the knowledge which we once before possessed, would not that which we call learning be a recovery of our own knowledge? And in saying that this is to remember, should we not say rightly?" "Certainly." "For this appeared to be possible, for one having perceived any thing, either by seeing or hearing, or employing any other sense, to form an idea of something different from this, which he had forgotten, and with which this was connected by being unlike or like. So that, as I said, one of these two things must follow: either we are all born with this knowledge, and we retain it through life, or those whom we say learn afterward do nothing else than remember, and this learning will be reminiscence." "Such, certainly, is the case, Socrates." 56. "Which, then, do you choose, Simmias: that we are born with knowledge, or that we afterward remember what we had formerly known?" "At present, Socrates, I am unable to choose." "But what? Are you able to choose in this case, and what do you think about it? Can a man who possesses knowledge give a reason for the things that he knows, or not?" "He needs must be able to do so, Socrates," he replied. "And do all men appear to you to be able to give a reason for the things of which we have just now been speaking?" "I wish they could," said Simmias; "but I am much more afraid that at this time to-morrow there will no longer be any one able to do this properly." "Do not all men, then, Simmias," he said, "seem to you to know these things?" "By no means." "Do they remember, then, what they once learned?" "Necessarily so." "When did our souls receive this knowledge? Not surely, since we were born into the world." "Assuredly not." "Before, then?" "Yes." "Our souls, therefore, Simmias, existed before they were in a human form, separate from bodies, and possessed intelligence." 57. "Unless, Socrates, we receive this knowledge at our birth, for this period yet remains." "Be it so, my friend. But at what other time do we lose it? for we are not born with it, as we have just now admitted. Do we lose it, then, at the very time in which we receive it? Or can you mention any other time?" "By no means, Socrates; I was not aware that I was saying nothing to the purpose." "Does the case then stand thus with us, Simmias?" he proceeded: "If those things which we are continually talking about really exist, the beautiful, the good, and every such essence, and to this we refer all things that come under the senses, as finding it to have a prior existence, and to be our own, and if we compare these things to it, it necessarily follows, that as these exist, so likewise our soul exists even before we are born; but if these do not exist, this discussion will have been undertaken in vain, is it not so? And is there not an equal necessity both that these things should exist, and our souls also, before we are born; and if not the former, neither the latter?" 58. "Most assuredly, Socrates," said Simmias, "there appears to me to be the same necessity; and the argument admirably tends to prove that our souls exist before we are born, just as that essence does which you have now mentioned. For I hold nothing so clear to me as this, that all such things most certainly exist, as the beautiful, the good, and all the rest that you just now spoke of; and, so far as I am concerned, the case is sufficiently demonstrated." "But how does it appear to Cebes?" said Socrates; "for it is necessary to persuade Cebes too." "He is sufficiently persuaded, I think," said Simmias, "although he is the most pertinacious of men in distrusting arguments. Yet I think he is sufficiently persuaded of this, that our soul existed before we were born. But whether, when we are dead, it will still exist does not appear to me to have been demonstrated, Socrates," he continued; "but that popular doubt, which Cebes just now mentioned, still stands in our way, whether, when a man dies, the soul is not dispersed, and this is the end of its existence. 59. For what hinders it being born, and formed from some other source, and existing before it came into a human body, and yet, when it has come, and is separated from this body, its then also dying itself, and being destroyed?" "You say well, Simmias," said Cebes; "for it appears that only one half of what is necessary has been demonstrated--namely, that our soul existed before we were born; but it is necessary to demonstrate further, that when we are dead it will exist no less than before we were born, if the demonstration is to be made complete." "This has been even now demonstrated, Simmias and Cebes," said Socrates, "if you will only connect this last argument with that which we before assented to, that every thing living is produced from that which is dead. For if the soul exists before, and it is necessary for it when it enters into life, and is born, to be produced from nothing else than death, and from being dead, how is it not necessary for it also to exist after death, since it must needs be produced again? 60. What you require, then, has been already demonstrated. However, both you and Simmias appear to me as if you wished to sift this argument more thoroughly, and to be afraid, like children, lest, on the soul's departure from the body, the winds should blow it away and disperse it, especially if one should happen to die, not in a calm, but in a violent storm." Upon this Cebes, smiling, said, "Endeavor to teach us better, Socrates, as if we were afraid, or rather not as if we were afraid, though perhaps there is some boy[19] within us who has such a dread. Let us, then, endeavor to persuade him not to be afraid of death, as of hobgoblins." "But you must charm him every day," said Socrates, "until you have quieted his fears." "But whence, Socrates," he said, "can we procure a skillful charmer for such a case, now that you are about to leave us?" _ |
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