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The Fourth Treatise - CHAPTER XV
Since, by their own argument, the Song has confuted them, and proved
that Time is not requisite to Nobility, it proceeds immediately to
confound their premisses, since of their false arguments no rust
remains in the mind which is disposed towards Truth; and this it does
when it says, "It follows then from this." Where it is to be known
that if it is not possible for a peasant to become a Noble, or for a
Noble son to be born of a humble father, as is advanced in their
opinion, of two difficulties one must follow.
The first is, that there can be no Nobility; the other is, that the
World may have been always full of men, so that from one alone the
Human Race cannot be descended; and this it is possible to prove.
If Nobility is not generated afresh, and it has been stated many times
that such is the basis of their opinion, the peasant man not being
able to beget it in himself, or the humble father to pass it on to his
son, the man always is the same as he was born; and such as the father
was born, so is the son born; and so this process from one condition
onwards is reached even by the first parent; for such as was the first
father, that is, Adam, so must the whole Human Race be, because from
him to the modern nations it will not be possible to find, according
to that argument, any change whatever. Then, if Adam himself was
Noble, we are all Noble; if he was vile, we are all vile or base;
which is no other than to remove the distinction between these
conditions, and thus it is to remove the conditions.
And the Song states this, which follows from what is advanced, saying,
"That all are high or base." And if this is not so, then any nation is
to be called Noble, and any is to be called vile, of necessity.
Transmutation from vileness into Nobility being thus taken away, the
Human Race must be descended from different ancestors, that is, some
from Nobles and some from vile persons, and so the Song says, "Or that
in Time there never was Beginning to our race," that is to say, one
beginning; it does not say beginnings. And this is most false
according to the Philosopher, according to our Faith, which cannot
lie, according to the Law and ancient belief of the Gentiles. For
although the Philosopher does not assert the succession from one first
man, yet he would have one essential being to be in all men, which
cannot possibly have different origins. And Plato would have that all
men depend upon one idea alone, and not on more or many, which is to
give them only one beginning. And undoubtedly Aristotle would laugh
very loudly if he heard of two species to be made out of the Human
Race, as of horses and asses; and (may Aristotle forgive me) one might
call those men asses who think in this way. For according to our Faith
(which is to be preserved in its entirety) it is most false, as
Solomon makes evident where he draws a distinction between men and the
brute animals, for he calls men "all the sons of Adam," and this he
does when he says: "Who knows if the spirits of the sons of Adam mount
upwards, and if those of the beasts go downwards?" And that it is
false according to the Gentiles, let the testimony of Ovid in the
first chapter of his Metamorphoses prove, where he treats of the
constitution of the World according to the Pagan belief, or rather
belief of the Gentiles, saying: "Man is born "--he did not say "Men;"
he said, "Man is born," or rather, "that the Artificer of all things
made him from Divine seed, or that the new earth, but lately parted
from the noble ether, retained seeds of the kindred Heaven, which,
mingled with the water of the river, formed the son of Japhet into an
image of the Gods, who govern all." Where evidently he asserts the
first man to have been one alone; and therefore the Song says, "But
that I cannot hold," that is, to the opinion that man had not one
beginning; and the Song subjoins, "Nor yet if Christians they." And it
says Christians, not Philosophers, or rather Gentiles, whose opinion
also is adverse, because the Christian opinion is of greater force,
and is the destroyer of all calumny, thanks to the supreme light of
Heaven, which illuminates it.
Then when I say, "Sound intellect reproves their words As false, and
turns away," I conclude this error to be confuted, and I say that it
is time to open the eyes to the Truth; and this is expressed when I
say, "And now I seek to tell, As it appears to me." It is now evident
to sound minds that the words of those men are vain, that is, without
a crumb or particle of Truth; and I say sound not without cause. Our
intellect may be said to be sound or unsound. And I say intellect for
the noble part of our Soul, which it is possible to designate by the
common word "Mind." It may be called sound or healthy, when it is not
obstructed in its action by sickness of mind or body, which is to know
what things are, as Aristotle expresses it in the third chapter on the
Soul.
For, owing to the sickness of the Soul, I have seen three horrible
infirmities in the minds of men.
One is caused by natural vanity, for many men are so presumptuous that
they believe they know everything, and, owing to this, they assert
things to be facts which are not facts. Tullius especially execrates
this vice in the first chapter of the Offices, and St. Thomas in his
book against the Gentiles, saying: "There are many men, so
presumptuous in their conceit, who believe that they can compass all
things with their intellect, deeming all that appears to them to be
true, and count as false that which does not appear to them." Hence it
arises that they never attain to any knowledge; believing themselves
to be sufficiently learned, they never inquire, they never listen;
they desire to be inquired of, and when a question is put, bad enough
is their reply. Of those men Solomon speaks in Proverbs: "Seest thou a
man that is hasty in his words? there is more hope of a fool than of
him."
Another infirmity of mind is caused by natural weakness or smallness,
for many men are so vilely obstinate or stubborn that they cannot
believe that it is possible either for them or for others to know
things; and such men as these never of themselves seek knowledge, nor
ever reason; for what other men say, they care not at all. And against
these men Aristotle speaks in the first book of the Ethics, declaring
those men to be insufficient or unsatisfactory hearers of Moral
Philosophy. Those men always live, like beasts, a life of grossness,
the despair of all learning.
The third infirmity of mind is caused by the levity of nature; for
many men are of such light fancy that in all their arguments they go
astray, and even when they make a syllogism and have concluded, from
that conclusion they fly off into another, and it seems to them most
subtle argument. They start not from any true beginning, and truly
they see nothing true in their imagination. Of those men the
Philosopher says that it is not right to trouble about them, or to
have business with them, saying, in the first book of Physics, that
against him who denies the first postulate it is not right to dispute.
And of such men as these are many idiots, who may not know their A B
C, and who would wish to dispute in Geometry, in Astrology, and in the
Science of Physics.
Also through sickness or defect of body, it is possible for the Mind
to be unsound or sick; even as through some primal defect at birth, as
with those who are born fools, or through alteration in the brain, as
with the madmen. And of this mental infirmity the Law speaks when it
says: "In him who makes a Will or Testament, at the time when he makes
the Will or Testament, health of mind, not health of body, is
required."
But to those intellects which from sickness of mind or body are not
infirm, but are free, diligent, and whole in the light of Truth, I say
it must be evident that the opinion of the people, which has been
stated above, is vain, that is, without any value whatever, worthless.
Afterwards the Song subjoins that I thus judge them to be false and
vain; and this it does when it says, "Sound intellect reproves their
words As false, and turns away." And afterwards I say that it is time
to demonstrate or prove the Truth; and I say that it is now right to
state what kind of thing true Nobility is, and how it is possible to
know the man in whom it exists; and I speak of this where I say:
And now I seek to tell
As it appears to me,
What is, whence comes, what signs attest
A true Nobility. _
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