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A Discourse of a Method for the Well Guiding of Reason, a non-fiction book by Rene Descartes

PART II

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PART II

I was then in _Germany_, whither the occasion of the Wars (which are not
yet finished) call'd me; and as I return'd from the Emperors Coronation
towards the Army, the beginning of Winter stopt me in a place, where
finding no conversation to divert me and on the other sides having by
good fortune no cares nor passions which troubled me, I stayd alone the
whole day, shut up in my Stove, where I had leasure enough to entertain
my self with my thoughts. Among which one of the first was that I betook
my self to consider, That oft times there is not so much perfection in
works compos'd of divers peeces, and made by the hands of severall
masters, as in those that were wrought by one only: So we may observe
that those buildings which were undertaken and finished by one onely,
are commonly fairer and better ordered then those which divers have
laboured to patch up, making use of old wals, which were built for other
purposes; So those ancient Cities which of boroughs, became in a
succession of time great Towns, are commonly so ill girt in comparison
of other regular Places, which were design'd on a flatt according to the
fancy of an Engeneer; and although considering their buildings
severally, we often find as much or more art, then in those of other
places; Yet to see how they are rank'd here a great one, there a little
one, and how they make the streets crooked and uneven, One would say,
That it was rather Fortune, then the will of Men indued with reason,
that had so disposed them. And if we consider, that there hath always
been certain Officers, whose charge it was, to take care of private
buildings, to make them serve for the publique ornament; We may well
perceive, that it's very difficult, working on the works of others, to
make things compleat. So also did I imagine, that those people who
formerly had been half wilde, and civiliz'd but by degrees, made their
laws but according to the incommodities which their crimes and their
quarrels constrain'd them to, could not be so wel pollic'd, as those who
from the beginning of their association, observ'd the constitutions of
some prudent Legislator. As it is very certain, that the state of the
true Religion, whose Ordinances God alone hath made, must be
incomparably better regulated then all others. And to speak of humane
things, I beleeve that if _Sparta_ hath formerly been most flourishing,
it was not by reason of the goodness of every of their laws in
particular, many of them being very strange, and even contrary to good
manners, but because they were invented by one only, They all tended to
One End. And so I thought the sciences in Books, at least those whose
reasons are but probable, and which have no demonstrations, having been
compos'd of, and by little and little enlarg'd with, the opinions of
divers persons, come not so near the Truth, as those simple reasonings
which an understanding Man can naturally make, touching those things
which occurr. And I thought besides also, That since we have all been
children, before we were Men; and that we must have been a long time
govern'd by our appetites, and by our Tutors, who were often contrary to
one another, and neither of which alwayes counsel'd us for the best;
It's almost impossible that our judgment could be so clear or so solid,
as it might have been, had we had the intire use of our reason from the
time of our birth, and been always guided by it alone.

Its true, we doe not see the houses of a whole Town pull'd down
purposely to re build them of another fashion; and to make the streets
the fairer; But we often see, that divers pull their own down to set
them up again, and that even sometimes they are forc'd thereunto, when
they are in danger to fall of themselves, and that their foundations are
not sure. By which example I perswaded my self, that there was no sense
for a particular person, to design the Reformation of a State, changing
all from the very foundations, and subverting all to redress it again:
Nor even also to reform the bodies of Sciences, or the Orders already
established in the Schools for teaching them. But as for all the
Opinions which I had till then receiv'd into my beleef, I could not doe
better then to undertake to expunge them once for all, that afterwards I
might place in their stead, either others which were better, or the same
again, as soon as I should have adjusted them to the rule of reason. And
I did confidently beleeve, that by that means I should succeed much
better in the conduct of my life, then if I built but on old
foundations, and only relyed on those principles, which I suffer'd my
self to be perswaded to in my youth, without ever examining the Truth of
them. For although I observ'd herein divers difficulties, yet were they
not without cure, nor comparable to those which occurr in the
reformation of the least things belonging to the publick: these great
bodies are too unweldy to be rais'd; being cast down, or to be held up
when they are shaken, neither can their falls be but the heavyest.

As for their imperfections, if they have any, as the only diversity
which is amongst them, is sufficient to assure us that many have.
Custome hath (without doubt) much sweetned them, and even it hath made
others wave, or insensibly correct a many, whereto we could not so well
by prudence have given a remedy. And in fine, They are alwayes more
supportable, then their change can be, Even, as the great Roads, which
winding by little and little betwixt mountains, become so plain and
commodious, with being often frequented, that it's much better to follow
them, then to undertake to goe in a strait line by climbing over the
rocks, and descending to the bottom of precipices. Wherefore I can by no
means approve of those turbulent and unquiet humors, who being neither
call'd by birth or fortune to the managing of publique affairs, yet are
alwayes forming in _Idea_, some new Reformation. And did I think there
were the least thing in this Discourse, which might render me suspected
of that folly, I should be extremely sorry to suffer it to be published;
I never had any designe which intended farther then to reform my own
thoughts and to build on a foundation which was wholly mine. But though
I present you here with a Modell of my work, because it hath
sufficiently pleased me; I would not therefore counsell any one to
imitate it. Those whom God hath better endued with his graces, may
perhaps have more elevated designes; but I fear me, lest already this be
too bold for some. The resolution only of quitting all those opinions
which we have formerly receiv'd into our belief, is not an example to be
followed by every One; and the world is almost compos'd but of two sorts
of Men, to whom it's no wayes convenient, to wit, of those, who
beleeving themselves more able then they are, cannot with-hold
themselves from precipitating their judgments, nor have patience enough
to steer all their thoughts in an orderly course. Whence it happens,
that if they should once take the liberty to doubt of those principles
which they have already received, and to stray from the common road,
they could never keep the path which leads strait forwards, and so,
would straggle all their lives. And of such who having reason and
modesty enough to judg that they are less able to distinguish truth from
falshood then others, from whom they may receive instruction, ought much
rather to be content to follow other Mens opinions, rather then to seek
after better themselves.

And for my part, I had undoubtedly been of the number of those latter,
had I never had but one Master, or had I not known the disputes which
have alwayes hapned amongst the most learned. For having learnt from
the very School, That one can imagin nothing so strange or incredible,
which had not been said by some one of the Philosophers; And having
since observ'd in my travails, That all those whose opinions are
contrary to ours, are not therefore barbarous or savage, but that many
use as much or more reason then we; and having consider'd how much one
Man with his own understanding, bred up from his childhood among the
French or the Dutch, becomes different from what he would be, had he
alwayes liv'd amongst the _Chineses_, or the _Cannibals_: And how even
in the fashion of our Clothes, the same thing which pleas'd ten years
since, and which perhaps wil please ten years hence, seems now to us
ridiculous and extravagant. So that it's much more Custome and Example
which perswades us, then any assured knowledg; and notwithstanding that
plurality of voices is a proof of no validity, in those truths which
are hard to be discovered; for that it's much more likely for one man
alone to have met with them, then a whole Nation; I could choose no Man
whose opinion was to be preferr'd before anothers: And I found my self
even constrain'd to undertake the conduct of my self.

But as a man that walks alone, and in the dark, I resolv'd to goe so
softly, and use so much circumspection in all things, that though I
advanc'd little, I would yet save my self from falling. Neither would I
begin quite to reject, some opinions, which formerly had crept into my
belief, without the consent of my reason, before I had employed time
enough to form the project of the work I undertook, and to seek the true
Method to bring me to the knowledg of all those things, of which my
understanding was capable.

I had a little studyed, being young, of the parts of Philosophy, Logick,
and of the Mathematicks, the Analysis of the Geometricians, and
_Algebra_: Three arts or sciences which seem'd to contribute somewhat
conducing to my designe: But examining them, I observ'd, That as for
Logick, its Sylogisms, and the greatest part of its other Rules, serve
rather to expound to another the things they know, or even as _Lullies_
art, to speak with judgment of the things we are ignorant of, then to
learn them. And although in effect it contain divers most true and good
precepts, yet there are so many others mixed amongst them, either
hurtfull or superfluous, That it's even as difficult to extract them, as
'tis to draw a _Diana_ or a _Mercury_ out of a lump of Marble, which is
not yet rough-hewn; as for the Analysis of the Ancients, and the
_Algebra_ of the Moderns; besides that, they extend only to matters very
abstract, and which seem to be of no use; The first being alwayes so
tyed to the consideration of figures, That it cannot exercise the
understanding, without very much tiring the imagination. And in the
latter they have so subjected themselves to certain Rules and cyphers,
that they have made a confus'd and obscure art which perplexeth the
minde, in stead of a Science to instruct it. For this reason, I thought
I ought to seek some other Method, which comprehending the advantages of
these, they might be exempt from their defects. And as the multitude of
Laws often furnisheth excuses for vice; so a State is fair better
polic'd, when having but a few, they are very strictly observ'd therein:
So, instead of the great many precepts whereof Logick is compos'd, I
thought these four following would be sufficient for me, if I took but a
firm and constant resolution not once to fail in the observation of
them.

The first was, never to receive any thing for true, but what I evidently
knew to be so; that's to say, Carefully to avoid Precipitation and
Prevention, and to admit nothing more into my judgment, but what should
so clearly and distinctly present it self to my minde, that I could have
no reason to doubt of it.

The second, to divide every One of these difficulties, which I was to
examine into as many parcels as could be, and, as was requisite the
better to resolve them.

The third, to lead my thoughts in order, beginning by the most simple
objects, and the easiest to be known; to rise by little and little, as
by steps, even to the knowledg of the most mixt; and even supposing an
Order among those which naturally doe not precede one the other.

And the last, to make every where such exact calculations, and such
generall reviews, That I might be confident to have omitted Nothing.

Those long chains of reasons, (though simple and easie) which the
Geometricians commonly use to lead us to their most difficult
demonstrations, gave me occasion to imagine, That all things which may
fall under the knowledg of Men, follow one the other in the same manner,
and so we doe only abstain from receiving any one for true, which is not
so, and observe alwayes the right order of deducing them one from the
other, there can be none so remote, to which at last we shall not
attain; nor so hid, which we shall not discover. Neither was I much
troubled to seek by which it behooved me to begin, for I already knew,
that it was by the most simple, and the easiest to be discern'd. But
considering, that amongst all those who formerly have sought the Truth
in Learning, none but the Mathematicians only could finde any
demonstrations, that's to say, any certain and evident reasons. I
doubted not, but that it was by the same that they have examin'd;
although I did hope for no other profit, but only that they would
accustome my Minde to nourish it self with Truths, and not content it
self with false Reasons. But for all this, I never intended to endevour
to learn all those particular Sciences which we commonly call'd
Mathematicall; And perceiving, that although their objects were
different, yet did they nevertheless agree altogether, in that they
consider no other thing, but the divers relations or proportions which
are found therein; I thought it therefore better to examine those
proportions in generall, and without supporting them but in those
subjects, which might the more easily serve to bring me to the knowledg
of them. But withall, without any wayes limiting them, That I might
afterwards the better sit them to all others whereto they might be
applyed. Having also observ'd, That to know them, it would be sometimes
needfull for me to consider every one in particular, or sometimes only
to restrain them, or comprehend many together; I thought, that to
consider them the better in particular I ought to suppose them in
lines, for as much as I find nothing more simple, nor which I could more
distinctly represent to my imagination, and to my sences; But to hold or
comprehend many in one, I was oblig'd to explain them by certain Cyphers
the shortest I possibly could, and that I should thereby borrow the best
of the Geometricall Analysis, and of Algebra, & so correct all the
defects of the one by the other.

As in effect I dare say, That the exact observation of those few
precepts I had chosen, gave me such a facility to resolve all the
questions whereto these two sciences extend; That in two or three months
space which I employed in the examination of them, having begun by the
most simple and most generall, and every Truth which I found being a
rule which afterwards served me to discover others; I did not only
compasse divers truths which I had formerly judged most difficult, But
me thought also that towards the end I could determin even in those
which I was ignorant of, by what means and how farr it was possible to
resolve them. Wherein perhaps I shall not appear to be very vain if you
consider, That there being but one truth of every thing, who ever finds
it, knows as much of it as one can know; And that for example a child
instructed in Arithmatick having made an addition according to his
rules, may be sure to have found, touching the sum he examined, all what
the wit of man could finde out. In a word the method which teacheth to
folow a right order, and exactly to enumerate all the circumstances of
what we seek, contains, whatsoever ascertains the rules of Arithmatick.

But that which pleas'd me most in this Method was the assurance I had,
wholly to use my reason, if not perfectly, at least as much as it was in
my power; Besides this, I perceived in the practice of it, my minde by
little and little accustom'd it self to conceive its objects more
clearly and distinctly; and having not subjected it to any particular
matter, I promised my self to apply it also as profitable to the
difficulties, of other sciences as I had to Algebra: Not that I
therefore durst at first undertake to examine all which might present
themselves, for that were contrary to the order it prescribes. But
having observ'd that all their principles were to be borrowed from
Philosophy, in which I had yet found none that were certain, I thought
it were needfull for me in the first place to endevor to establish some,
and that this being the most important thing in the world, wherein
precipitation and prevention were the most to be feared, I should not
undertake to performe it, till I had attain'd to a riper Age then XXIII.
which was then mine. Before I had formerly employed a long time in
preparing my self thereunto, aswel in rooting out of my minde all the
ill opinions I had before that time received, as in getting a stock of
experience to serve afterwards for the subject of my reasonings, and in
exercising my self always in the Method I had prescribed. That I might
the more and more confine my self therein. _

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