Part 2

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_ The duke of BEDFORD spoke to the following effect:--My lords, the assurance which the noble lord who spoke last declares himself to have conceived of being able to demonstrate the propriety of the present measures, must surely arise from some intelligence which has been hitherto suppressed, or some knowledge of future events peculiar to himself; for I cannot discover any force in the arguments which he has been pleased to use, that could produce in him such confidence of success, nor any circumstances in the present appearance of Europe, that do not seem to demand a different conduct.

The reasonableness of our measures at this time, as at all others, must be evinced by arguments drawn from an attentive review of the state of our own country, compared with that of the neighbouring nations; for no man will deny, that those methods of proceeding which are at one time useful, may at another be pernicious; and that either a gradual rotation of power, or a casual variation of interest, may very properly produce changes in the counsels of the most steady and vigorous administration.

It is therefore proper, in the examination of this question, to consider what is the state of our own nation, and what is to be hoped or feared from the condition of those kingdoms, which are most enabled by their situation to benefit or to hurt us: and in inquiry, my lords, an inquiry that can give little pleasure to an honest and benevolent mind, it immediately occurs, that we are a nation exhausted by a long war, and impoverished by the diminution of our commerce; and the result, therefore, of this first consideration is, that those measures are most eligible which are most frugal; and that to waste the publick treasure in unnecessary expenses, or to load the people with new taxes only to display a mockery of war on the continent, or to amuse ourselves, our allies, or our enemies, with the idle ostentation of unnecessary numbers, is to drain from the nation the last remains of its ancient vigour, instead of assisting its recovery from its present languors.

But money, however valuable, however necessary, has sometimes been imprudently and unseasonably spared; and an ill-timed parsimony has been known to hasten calamities, by which those have been deprived of all who would not endeavour to preserve it by the loss of part. It is therefore to be considered, whether measures less expensive would not have been more dangerous; and whether we have not, by hiring foreign troops, though at a very high rate, at a rate which would have been demanded from no other nation, purchased an exemption from distresses, insults, and invasions.

The only nations, my lords, whom we have any reason to suspect of a design to invade us, or that have power to put any such design in execution, are well known to be the French and Spaniards; from these, indeed, it may justly be expected, that they will omit no opportunity of gratifying that hatred which difference of religion and contrariety of interest cannot fail to continue from age to age; and therefore we ought never to imagine ourselves safe, while it is in their power to endanger us. But of these two nations, my lords, the one is already disarmed by the navies of Britain, which confine her fleets to their harbours, and, as we have been just now informed, preclude her armies from supplies: the other is without a fleet able to transport an army, her troops are dispersed in different countries, and her treasures exhausted by expeditions or negotiations equally expensive.

There is, therefore, my lords, no danger of an invasion, even though we had no forces by which it could be opposed; but much less is it to be feared, when it is remembered, that the sea is covered with our ships of war, and that all the coasts of Europe are awed and alarmed by the navies of Britain.

This then, my lords, is surely the time, when we ought not to have sacrificed any immediate and apparent interest to the fear of attempts from Spain or France; when we might without danger have assisted our allies with our national troops, and have spared that money which we have so lavishly bestowed upon auxiliaries; when we might securely have shown the powers of the continent how much the British valour is yet to be feared, and how little our late losses or disgraces are to be imputed to the decline of our courage or our strength.

I suppose, my lords, no man will confess, that foreign troops have been hired as more to be trusted for their skill or bravery than our own. To dispute the palm of courage with any nation would be a reproach to the British name; and if our soldiers are not at least equally disciplined with those of other countries, it must be owned, that taxes have been long paid to little purpose, that the glitter of reviews has been justly ridiculed as an empty show, and that we have long been flattered by our ministers and generals with false security.

But though I am far from believing, that the army has been supported only for the defence of our country; and though I know, that their officers are frequently engaged in employments more important in the opinion of their directors, than that of regulating the discipline of their regiments, and teaching the use of arms and the science of war; yet, as I believe the courage of Britons such as may often supply the want of skill, I cannot but conclude, that they are at least as formidable as the troops of other countries, especially when I remember, that they enter the field incited and supported by the reputation of their country.

Why then, my lords, is the nation condemned to support, at once, a double burden; to pay at home an army which can be of no use, and to hire auxiliaries, perhaps, equally unactive; to make war, if any war be intended, at an unnecessary expense, and to pay, at once, a fleet which only floats upon the ocean, an army which only awes the villages from which it is supported, and a body of mercenaries, of which no man can yet conjecture with what design they have been retained.

That they are intended for the support of the queen of Hungary has been, indeed, asserted; and this contract has been produced as an instance of the zeal of our ministers for the assertion of the Pragmatick sanction, the preservation of the liberties of Europe, and the suppression of the ambitious enterprises of the house of Bourbon; but surely, my lords, had the assistance of that illustrious princess been their sole or principal intention, had they in reality dedicated the sum which is to be received by the troops of Hanover, to the sacred cause of publick faith and universal liberty, they might have found methods of promoting it much more efficaciously at no greater expense. Had they remitted that money to the queen, she would have been enabled to call nations to her standard, to fill the plains of Germany with the hardy inhabitants of the mountains and the deserts, and have deluged the empire of France with multitudes equally daring and rapacious, who would have descended upon a fruitful country like vultures on their prey, and have laid those provinces in ruin which now smile at the devastation of neighbouring countries, secure in the protection of their mighty monarch.

By this method of carrying on the war, we might have secured our ally from danger which I cannot but think imminent and formidable, though it seems, at present, not to be feared. By so large an addition to her troops, she would have been enabled to frustrate those designs, which her success may incline the king of Prussia to form against her; for with whatever tranquillity he may now seem to look upon this general commotion, his conduct gives us no reason to imagine, that he has changed his maxims, that he is now forgetful or negligent of his own interest, or that he will not snatch the first opportunity of aggrandizing himself by new pretensions to the queen of Hungary's dominions.

At least, my lords, it may without scruple be asserted, that the hopes which some either form or affect of engaging him in a confederacy for the support of the Pragmatick sanction, are merely chimerical. He who has hitherto considered no interest but his own, he who has perhaps endangered himself by attempting to weaken the only power to which he, as well as the other princes of the empire, can have recourse for protection from the ambition of France, and has, therefore, broken the rules of policy only to gratify a favourite passion, will scarcely concur in the exaltation of that family which he has so lately endeavoured to depress, and which he has so much exasperated against him. If he is at length, my lords, alarmed at the ambition of the house of Bourbon, and has learned not to facilitate those designs which are in reality formed against himself, it cannot be doubted, that he looks with equal fear on the house of Austria, that he knows his safety to consist only in the weakness of both, and that in any contest between them, the utmost that can be hoped from him is neutrality.

But, my lords, he whose security depends only on a supposition that men will not deviate from right reason or true policy, is in a state which can afford him very little tranquillity or confidence: whatever is necessarily to be preserved, ought to be defended, not only from certain and constant danger, but from casual and possible injuries; and amongst the rest, from those which may proceed from the mutability of will, or the depravation of understanding; nor shall we sufficiently establish the house of Austria, if we leave it liable to be shaken whenever the king of Prussia shall feel his ambition rekindled, or his malevolence excited; we must not leave it dependant on the friendship or policy of the neighbouring powers, but must enable it once more to awe the empire, and set at defiance the malice of its enemies.

This, my lords, might have been done by a liberal subsidy, by which armies might have been levied, garrisons established, and cities fortified; and why any other method was pursued, what reason can be assigned? what, but an inclination to aggrandize and enrich a contemptible province, and to deck with the plunder of Britain the electorate of Hanover?

It has been suspected, my lords, (nor has the suspicion been without foundation,) that our measures have long been regulated by the interest of his majesty's electoral territories; these have been long considered as a gulf into which the treasures of this nation have been thrown; and it has been observed, that the state of the country has, since the accession of its princes to this throne, been changed without any visible cause; affluence has begun to wanton in their towns, and gold to glitter in their cottages, without the discovery of mines, or the increase of their trade; and new dominions have been purchased, of which it can scarcely be imagined, that the value was paid out of the revenues of Hanover.

This, my lords, is unpopular, illegal, and unjust; yet this might be borne, in consideration of great advantages, of the protection of our trade, and the support of our honour. But there are men who dare to whisper, and who, perhaps, if their suspicions receive new confirmation, will publickly declare, that for the preservation of Hanover, our commerce has been neglected, and our honour impaired; that to secure Hanover from invasion, the house of Bourbon has been courted, and the family of Austria embarrassed and depressed. These men assert, without hesitation, that when we entered into a league with France against the emperour and the Spaniards, in the reign of the late emperour, no part of the British dominions were in danger; and that the alarm which was raised to reconcile the nation to measures so contrary to those which former ages had pursued, was a fictitious detestable artifice of wicked policy, by which Britain was engaged in the defence of dominions to which we owe no regard, as we can receive no real advantage from them.

It were to be wished, that no late instance could be produced of conduct regulated by the same principles; and that this shameful, this pernicious partiality had been universally allowed to have ceased with the late reign; but it has never yet been shown, that the late neutrality, by which Hanover was preserved, did not restrain the arms of Britain; nor when it has been asked, why the Spanish army was, when within reach of the cannon of the British navy, peaceably transported to Italy, has any other reason been assigned, than that the transports could not be destroyed without a breach of the neutrality of Hanover?

This, my lords, is a subject on which I could have only been induced to dwell, by my zeal for the present establishment, and my personal affection for his majesty. It is universally allowed, that not only the honour and prosperity, but the safety of a British monarch, depends upon the affections of his subjects; and that neither splendid levees, nor large revenues, nor standing armies, can secure his happiness or his power any longer than the people are convinced of his tenderness and regard, of his attention to their complaints, and his zeal for their interest. If, therefore, it should ever be generally believed, that our king considers this nation only as appendent to his electoral dominions, that he promotes the interest of his former subjects at the expense of those by whom he has been exalted to this awful throne, and that our commerce, our treasures, and our lives, are sacrificed to the safety, or to the enlargement of distant territories, what can be expected? what but murmurs, disaffection, and distrust, and their natural consequences, insurrection and rebellion; rebellion, of which no man can foresee the event, and by which that man may perhaps be placed upon the throne, whom we have so wisely excluded and so solemnly abjured.

Of this unreasonable regard to the interest of Hanover, the contract which we are now considering exhibits, if not a proof too apparent to be denied, yet such an appearance as we ought for our own sakes and that of his majesty to obviate; and therefore I think the, address which is now proposed in the highest degree reasonable; and am convinced, that by complying with our request, his majesty will regain the affections of many of his subjects, whom a long train of pernicious measures have filled with discontent; and preserve the loyalty of many others, who, by artful representations of the motives and consequences of this contract, may be alienated and perverted.

Lord BATHURST replied to the following purport:--My lords, as I have no reason to doubt of the noble duke's affection to the present royal family, I am convinced, that the ardour of his expressions is the effect of his zeal, and that the force of his representations proceeds only from the strength of his conviction; and, therefore, I am far from intending to censure any accidental negligence of language, or any seeming asperity of sentiment. I know, that the openness and dignity of mind which has incited him to declare his opinion with so much freedom, will induce him likewise to retract it, when he shall be convinced, that he has been deceived by false representations, or that he has formed his conclusions too hastily, without an attentive examination of the question in its whole extent.

I shall, therefore, endeavour to explain the motives upon which all these measures have been formed which we have heard so warmly censured; and show, that they were the consequences not of haste and negligence, but of vigilance and circumspection; that they were formed upon a deliberate survey of the complicated interests of the European powers, and dictated not by a partiality to Hanover, but a faithful attention to the interest of Britain.

It has been already observed by a noble lord, that there was no choice allowed us; that the state of Europe required that we should not sit unactive; and that yet there was no other method of acting, by which we could benefit our allies, or injure our enemies; and that, therefore, though our interposition had not produced all the effects which our zeal might incline us to wish, yet our conduct ought not to be condemned; because, though we did not press forward through the nearest path to the great object of our pursuit, we exerted our utmost speed in the only way that was left open. This, my lords, is, in my opinion, a very just apology; nor do I see, that this vindication can be confuted or invalidated, otherwise than by showing, that some different measures, measures equally reasonable, were equally in our power.

But because the plea of necessity may, perhaps, be evaded; and because it is, at least, pleasing to discover, that what was necessary was likewise convenient, I shall endeavour to show, that our measures have produced already such effects as have sufficiently rewarded our expenses; and that we may yet reasonably hope, that greater advantages will arise from them.

There are, indeed, some whom it will not be easy to satisfy, some who declare not against the manner in which the war is prosecuted, but against the war itself; who think the power of France too formidable to be opposed, and the British people too much exhausted or enervated to hold any longer the balance of the continent.

I have, indeed, my lords, always declared myself of a different opinion, and have frequently endeavoured to rouse others from a kind of indolent despair and tame acquiescence in the attempts of the French, by representations of the wealth and force, the influence and alliances of our own nation. I have often asserted, that I did not doubt but her conquests might be stopped by vigorous opposition, and that the current of her power, which had by artificial machines of policy been raised higher than its source, would subside and stagnate, when its course was no longer assisted by cowardice, and its way levelled by submission.

These, my lords, were my sentiments, and this was my language, at a time when all the powers of Europe conspired to flatter the pride of France by falling at her feet, when her nod was solicitously watched by all the princes of the empire, when there was no safety but by her protection, nor any enterprise but by her permission; when her wealth influenced the councils of nations, when war was declared at her command in the remotest corners of Europe, and every contest was submitted to her arbitration.

Even at this time, my lords, was I sufficiently confident of the power of my own country, to set at defiance, in my own mind, this gigantick state. I considered all additions to its greatness rather as the tumour of disease than the shootings of vigour, and thought that its nerves grew weaker as its corpulence increased. Of my own nation I saw, that neither its numbers nor its courage were diminished; I had no reason to believe our soldiers or our sailors less brave than their fathers; and, therefore, imagined that whenever they should be led out against the same enemies, they would fight with the same superiority and the same success.

But for these hopes, my lords, I was sometimes pitied by those who thought themselves better acquainted with the state of Europe than myself, and sometimes ridiculed by those who had been long accustomed to depress their own country, and to represent Britain as only the shadow of what it once was; to deride our armies and our fleets, and describe us impoverished and corrupted, sunk into cowardice, and delighted with slavery.

That my opinion is now likely to be justified, and that those who have hitherto so confidently opposed me, will soon be obliged to acknowledge their mistake, is of very small importance; nor is my self-love so predominant as to incline me to reckon the confirmation of my predictions, or the vindication of my sagacity among the benefits which we are now about to receive. We are now soon to be convinced that France is not irresistible, nor irresistible to Britain. We are now to see the embroilers of the universe entangled in their own schemes, and the depopulators of kingdoms destroyed in those fields which they have so wantonly laid waste. We shall see justice triumphant over oppression, and insolence trampled by those whom she has despised. We shall see the powers of Europe once more equally balanced, and the balance placed again in the hands of Britain.

If it be required upon what events these expectations are founded; and if it be alleged, that we have no such resolutions to hope from the measures that have been hitherto pursued; it has been affirmed by a noble lord, that our armies in Flanders are useless, and that our motions have given neither courage nor strength to any other powers; that the queen of Hungary is yet equally distressed, and that the French still pursue their schemes without any interruption from us or our allies, I shall hope by an impartial account of the present state of the continent to show, that his assertions are groundless, and his opinion erroneous.

The inactivity of our army in Flanders has, indeed, furnished a popular topick of declamation and ridicule. It is well known how little the bulk of mankind are acquainted, either with arts of policy, or of war; how imperfectly they must always understand the conduct of ministers or generals, and with what partiality they always determine in favour of their own nation. Ignorance, my lords, conjoined with partiality, must always produce expectations which no address nor courage can gratify; and it is scarcely, therefore, to be hoped, that the people will be satisfied with any account of the conduct of our generals, which does not inform them of sieges and battles, slaughter and devastation. They expect that a British army should overrun the continent in a summer, that towns should surrender at their summons, and legions retire at their shout; that they should drive nations before them, and conquer empires by marching over them.

Such, my lords, are the effects which the people of Britain expect; and as they have hitherto been disappointed, their disappointment inclines them to complain. They think an army useless which gains no victories, and ask to what purpose the sword is drawn, if the blood of their enemies is not to be shed? But these are not the sentiments of your lordships, whose acquaintance with publick affairs informs you, that victories are often gained where no standards are taken, nor newspapers filled with lists of the slain; and that by drawing the sword opportunely, the necessity of striking is often prevented. You know, that the army which hovers over a country, and draws the forces which defend it to one part, may destroy it without invading it, by exposing it to the invasion of another; and that he who withholds an army from action, is not less useful to his ally than he that defeats it.

This, my lords, is the present use of our troops in Flanders; the French are kept in continual terrour, and are obliged to detach to that frontier those troops which, had they not been thus diverted, would have been employed in the empire; and, surely, an army is not unactive which withholds a double number from prosecuting their design.

That our motions have not encouraged other powers to fulfil their engagements, or to unite in the defence of the general liberty of Europe, cannot truly be asserted. The Dutch apparently waken from their slumber; whether it was real or affected, they at least discover less fear of the French, and have already given such proofs of their inclination to join with us, as may encourage us to expect, that they will, in a short time, form with us another confederacy, and employ their utmost efforts in the common cause.

What they have already offered will at least enable us to assist the queen of Hungary with greater numbers, and her to employ her troops where she is most pressed; for they have engaged to garrison the towns of Flanders, which, since they cannot be evacuated, is in effect an offer of auxiliary troops; since, if those forces had been added to the Austrian army, an equal number of Austrians must have been subducted to garrison the frontier.

It is, therefore, without reason, that narrow-minded censurers charge us with becoming the slaves of the Dutch, with fighting their battles and defending their barrier, while they pursue their commerce in tranquillity, enjoy peace at the expense of British blood, and grow rich by the profusion of British treasure. It appears, that they concur in the preservation of themselves and of Europe, though with delays and caution; since, though they do not send forces into the field, they supply the place of those which are sent, and enable others to destroy those whom they are not yet persuaded to attack themselves.

The constitution of that republick is, indeed, such as makes its alliance not valuable, on sudden emergencies, in proportion to its wealth and power. The determinations of large assemblies are always slow; because there are many opinions to be examined, many proposals to be balanced, and many objections to be answered. But with much more difficulty must any important resolution be formed, where it must be the joint act of the whole assembly, where every individual has a negative voice, and unanimity alone can make a decision obligatory. Wherever this is the form of government, the state lies at the mercy of every man who has a vote in its councils; and the corruption or folly or obstinacy of one may retard or defeat the most important designs, lay his country open to the inroads of an enemy, dissolve the most solemn alliances, and involve a nation in misery.

This, my lords, I need not observe to be the Dutch constitution, nor need I tell this assembly, that we are not always to judge of the general inclination of that people by the procedure of their deputies, since particular men may be influenced by private views, or corrupted by secret promises or bribes; and those designs may be retarded by their artifices which the honest and impartial universally approve. This is, perhaps, the true reason of the present delays which have furnished occasion to such loud complaints, complaints of which we may hope quickly to have an end; since it can hardly be doubted, but the general voice of the people will there, as in other places, at last prevail, and the prejudices or passions of private men give way to the interest of the publick.

That the queen of Hungary is now equally distressed, and that she has received no advantage from the assistance, which we have, at so great an expense, appeared to give her, is, likewise, very far from being true. Let any man compare her present condition with that in which she was before Britain engaged in her cause, and it will easily be perceived how much she owes to the alliance of this nation. She was then flying before her enemies, and reduced to seek for shelter in the remotest part of her dominions, while her capital was fortified in expectation of a siege. Those who then were distributing her provinces, and who almost hovered over her only remaining kingdom, are now retiring before her troops. The army by which it was intended that her territories in Italy should be taken from her, is now starving in the countries which it presumed to invade; and the troops which were sent to its assistance are languishing at the feet of mountains which they will never pass.

These are the effects, my lords, of those measures, which, for want of being completely understood, or attentively considered, have been so vehemently censured. These measures, my lords, however injudicious, however unseasonable, have embarrassed the designs of France, and given relief to the queen of Hungary; they have animated the Dutch to action, and kindled in all the powers of Europe, who were intimidated by the French armies, new hopes and new resolutions; they have, indeed, made a general change in the state of Europe, and given a new inclination to the balance of power. Not many months have elapsed, since every man appeared to consider the sovereign of France as the universal monarch, whose will was not to be opposed, and whose force was not to be resisted. We now see his menaces despised and his propositions rejected; every one now appears to hope rather than to fear, though lately a general panick was spread over this part of the globe, and fear had so engrossed mankind, that scarcely any man presumed to hope.

But it is objected, my lords, that though our measures should be allowed not to have been wholly ineffectual, and our money appear not to have been squandered only to pay the troops of Hanover, yet our conduct is very far from meriting either applause or approbation; since much greater advantages might have been purchased at much less expense, and by methods much less invidious and dangerous.

The queen of Hungary might, in the opinion of these censurers, have raised an hundred thousand men with the money which we must expend in hiring only sixteen thousand, and might have destroyed those enemies whom we have hitherto not dared to attack.

Those who make this supposition the foundation of their censures, appear not to remember, that the queen of Hungary's dominions, like those of other princes, may, by war, be in time exhausted; that the loss of inhabitants is not repaired in any country but by slow degrees; and that there is no place yet discovered where money will procure soldiers without end, or where new harvests of men rise up annually, ready to fight those quarrels in which their predecessors were swept away. If the money had, instead of being employed in hiring auxiliaries, been remitted to the queen, it is not probable that she could, at any rate, have brought a new army together. But it is certain, that her new troops must have been without arms and without discipline. It might have been found, perhaps, in this general disturbance of the world, not easy to have supplied them with weapons; and it is well known how long time is required to teach raw forces the art of war, and enable them to stand before a veteran enemy.

It was, therefore, necessary to assist her rather with troops than money; and since troops were necessarily to be hired, why should we employ the forces of Hanover less willingly than those of any other nation? To assert that they have more or less courage than others is chimerical, nor can any man suppose them either more brave or timorous than those of the neighbouring countries, without discovering the meanest prejudices, and the narrowest conceptions; without showing that he is wholly unacquainted with human nature, and that he is influenced by the tales of nurses, and the boasts of children.

There was, therefore, no objection against the troops of Hanover, that was not of equal strength against all foreign troops; and there was at least one argument in their favour, that they were subjects of the same prince; and that, therefore, we could have no reason to fear their defection, or to suspect their fidelity.

The electorate of Hanover, with whatever contempt or indignation some persons may affect to mention it, is to be considered, at least, as a state in alliance with Britain, and to receive from us that support which the terms of that alliance may demand.

Any other regard, my lords, indeed, it is not necessary to contend for; since it cannot be proved, that in this transaction we have acted otherwise than as with allies, or hired the troops on conditions which those of any other nation would not have obtained, or on any which they will not deserve; since your lordships have received assurances, that they are ready to enter the field, and to march into Germany against the common enemy. That we might have raised new troops in our own nation, and have augmented our army with an equal number of men, cannot be denied; nor do I doubt, my lords, but our countrymen would be equally formidable with any other forces; but it must be remembered, that an army is not to be levied in an instant, and that our natives, however warlike, are not born with the knowledge of the use of arms; and who knows, whether Europe might not have been enslaved before a British army could have been raised and disciplined for its deliverance?

Whether this account of our measures will satisfy those who have hitherto condemned them, I am not able to foretel. There are, indeed, some reasons for suspecting, that they blame not, because they disapprove, but because they think it necessary either to the character of discernment, or of probity, to censure the ministry, whatever maxims are pursued. Of this disposition it is no slight proof, that contrary measures have been sometimes condemned by the same men with the same vehemence; and that even compliance with their demands has not stilled their outcries. When the ministry appeared unwilling to engage in the war of Germany, without the concurrence of the other powers who had engaged to support the Pragmatick sanction, they were hourly reproached with being the slaves of France, with betraying the general cause of Europe, and with repressing that generous ardour, by which our ancestors have been incited to stand forth as the asserters of universal liberty, and to fight the quarrel of mankind. They were marked out as either cowards or traitors, and doomed to infamy as the accomplices of tyranny, engaged in a conspiracy against their allies, their country, and their posterity.

At length the Britons have roused again, and again declared themselves the supporters of right, whenever injured; they have again raised their standards in the continent, and prepared to march again through those regions where their victories are yet celebrated, and their bravery yet reverenced. The hills of Germany will again sound with the shouts of that people who once marched to her deliverance through all the obstructions that art or power could form against them, and which broke through the pass of Schellembourg, to rout the armies that were ranged behind it.

Now it might be expected, my lords, that, at least, those who were before dissatisfied, should declare their approbation; for surely where peace or neutrality is improper, there is nothing left but war. Yet experience shows us, that men resolved to blame will never want pretences for venting their malignity; and where nothing but malignity is the consequence of opposite measures, we must necessarily conclude, that there is a fixed resolution to blame, and that all vindications will be ineffectual.

Some have, indeed, found out a middle course between censure and approbation, and declare, that they think these measures now justifiable, because we have proceeded too far to retreat with honour; and that though at first a better scheme might have been formed, yet this, which has hitherto been pursued, ought not now to be changed.

I, my lords, though it is not of very great importance to confute an opinion by which the measures of the government will not be obstructed, cannot forbear to declare myself of different sentiments, and to assert, in opposition to artful calumnies and violent invectives, that the present measures were originally right, that they were such as prudence would dictate, and experience approve, and such as we ought again to take, if we have again the power of choice.

I am, indeed, far from doubting, but these measures will, in a short time, be justified by success; a criterion by which, however unjustly, the greatest part of mankind will always judge of the conduct of their governours; for it is apparent, my lords, that howsoever the French power, commerce, and wealth, have been exaggerated by those that either love or fear them, they will not long be able to stand against us; their funds will in a short time fail them, and their armies must be disbanded, when they can no longer be paid, lest, instead of protecting their country, they should be inclined to plunder it.

The abundance of our wealth, my lords, and the profit of our commerce, are sufficiently apparent from the price of our stocks, which were never before supported at the same height for so long a time; and of the fall of which neither an actual war with Spain, nor the danger which has been suggested of another with France, with France in the full possession of all its boasted advantages, has yet been able to produce any token. Another proof of the exuberance of our riches, and the prosperity of our commerce, by which they are acquired, is the facility with which the government can raise in an instant the greatest sums, and the low interest at which they are obtained. If we compare our state in this respect with that of France, the insuperable difficulties under which they must contend with us, will sufficiently discover themselves. It is well known, my lords, that we have lately raised the money which the service of each year required, at the interest of three for a hundred; nor is it likely that there will be any necessity of larger interest, though our annual demands were to be equal to those of the last war. But the French are well known to raise the sums which their exigencies require on very different terms, and to have paid ten for a hundred for all the money which their late projects have required; projects which they cannot pursue long at such enormous expense, and by which their country must in a short time be ruined, even without opposition.

While we can, therefore, raise three millions for less than the French can obtain one, and, by consequence, support three regiments at the same expense as one is supported in their service, we have surely no reason to dread the superiority of their numbers, or to fear that they will conquer by exhausting us.

Thus, my lords, I have delivered my opinion with freedom and impartiality; and shall patiently hearken to any objections that shall arise against it, supported by the consciousness, that a confutation will only show me that I have been mistaken; but will not deprive me of the satisfaction of reflecting, that I have not been wanting to my country; and that if I have approved or defended improper measures, I at least consulted no other interest than that of Britain.

Lord HERVEY spoke next, to the following effect:--My lords, it is not without that concern which every man ought to feel at the apparent approach of publick calamities, that I have heard the measures which are now the subject of our inquiry so weakly defended, when their vindication is endeavoured with so much ardour, and laboured with so much address.

The objections which press upon the mind, at the first and slightest view of our proceedings, are such as require the closest attention, such as cannot but alarm every man who has studied the interest of his country, and who sincerely endeavours to promote it; and therefore it might be hoped, that those who appear to have thought them insufficient, are able to produce, in opposition to them, the strongest arguments, and the clearest deductions.

When we attempt the consideration of our present condition, and inquire by what means our prosperity may be secured, the first reflection that occurs, is, that we are traders, that all our power is the consequence of our wealth, and our wealth the product of our trade. It is well known, that trade can only be pursued under the security of peace; that a nation which has a larger commerce, must make war on disadvantageous terms against one that has less; as of two contiguous countries, the more fruitful has most to fear from an invasion by its neighbour.

It is visible, likewise, to any man who considers the situation of Britain, that there is no nation by which our trade can in time of war be so much obstructed as by France, of which the coasts are opposite to ours, and which can send out small vessels, and seize our merchants in the mouths of our harbours, or in the Channel of which we boast the sovereignty: and all those who have heard or read of the last war, in which we gained so much honour, and so little advantage, know that the privateers of France injured us more than its navies or its armies; and that a thousand victories on the continent, where we were only contending for the rights of others, were a very small recompense for the obstruction of our commerce; nor can he feel much tenderness for mankind, who would purchase by the ruin and distress of a thousand families, industrious and innocent, the momentary festivity of a triumph, or the idle glare of an illumination.

Yet, my lords, this nation, however zealous for its commerce, is about to engage in a war, in a war with the only state by which our commerce can be impaired; it is about to support new armies on the continent without allies, and without treasure.

That we are without treasure, and that our trade, by which only our funds can be supplied, has lately been very much diminished, is too easy to prove in opposition to the specious display which the noble lord, who spoke last, has been pleased to make of the exuberance of our wealth.

If the abundance of our riches be such as it has been represented, why are no measures formed for the payment of the publick debts? of which no man will say, that they are not in themselves a calamity, and the source of many calamities yet greater; of which it cannot be denied, that they multiply dependence by which our constitution may sometimes be endangered. Why are those debts not only unpaid, but increased by annual additions to such a height, that the payment of them must soon become desperate, and the publick sink under the burden?

That our trade, my lords, and by consequence our wealth, is of late diminished, may be proved beyond controversy, even to those whose interest it is not to believe it, and upon whom, therefore, it cannot be expected, that arguments will have a great effect. The produce of the customs was the last year less by half a million than the mean revenue; and as our customs must always bear a certain proportion to trade, we may form an indisputable estimate from them of its increase or its decline.

The rise of our stocks, my lords, is such a proof of riches, as dropsical tumours are of health; it shows not the circulation, but the stagnation of our money; and though it may flatter us with a false appearance of plenty for a time, will soon prove, that it is both the effect and cause of poverty, and will end in weakness and destruction.

When commerce flourishes, when its profit is certain and secure, men will employ their money in the exchange of commodities, by which greater advantage may be gained, than by putting it into the hands of brokers; but when every ship is in danger of being intercepted by privateers, and the insurer divides the profit of every voyage with the merchant, it is natural to choose a safer, though a less profitable traffick; and rather to treasure money in the funds, than expose it on the ocean.

But, my lords, the ministers themselves have sufficiently declared their opinion of the state of the national wealth, by the method which they have taken to raise those supplies of which they boast with how great facility they are raised.

When they found that new expenses required new taxes, it was necessary to examine what could be taxed, or upon which part of the nation any other burdens could be laid without immediate ruin. They turned over the catalogue of all our manufactures, and found, that scarcely any of the conveniencies, or even the necessaries of life, were without an impost. They examined all the classes of our traders, and readily discovered, that the greatest number of those who endeavoured to support themselves by honest industry, were struggling with poverty, and scarcely able to provide to-day what would be necessary to-morrow. They saw our prisons crowded with debtors, and our papers filled with the names of bankrupts, of whom many may be supposed to have miscarried without idleness, extravagance, or folly.

They saw, therefore, my lords, that industry must sink under any addition to its load, a consideration which could afford no proof of the abundance of our wealth. They saw that our commodities would be no longer manufactured, if their taxes were increased; and, therefore, it was necessary to raise money by some other method, since all those which have been hitherto practised were precluded.

This, my lords, was no easy task; but however difficult, it has been accomplished; and to those great politicians must posterity be indebted for a new scheme of supplying the expenses of a war.

In the time of the late ministry it had been observed, that drunkenness was become a vice almost universal among the common people; and that as the liquor which they generally drank was such that they could destroy their reason by a small quantity, and at a small expense, the consequence of general drunkenness was general idleness; since no man would work any longer than was necessary to lay him asleep for the remaining part of the day. They remarked, likewise, that the liquor which they generally drank was to the last degree pernicious to health, and destructive of that corporeal vigour by which the business of life is to be carried on; and a law was therefore made, by which it was intended that this species of debauchery, so peculiarly fatal, should be prevented.

Against the end of this law no man has hitherto made the least objection; no one has dared to signalize himself as an open advocate for vice, or attempted to prove that drunkenness was not injurious to society, and contrary to the true ends of human being. The encouragement of wickedness of this shameful kind, wickedness equally contemptible and hateful, was reserved for the present ministry, who are now about to supply those funds which they have exhausted by idle projects and romantick expeditions, at the expense of health and virtue; who have discovered a method of recruiting armies by the destruction of their fellow-subjects; and while they boast themselves the assertors of liberty, are endeavouring to enslave us by the introduction of those vices, which in all countries, and in every age, have made way for despotick power.

Even this expedient, my lords, must in a short time fail them; the products of vice as well as of commerce must in time be exhausted; and what will then remain? The honest and industrious must feel the weight of some new imposition, which the sagacity of experienced oppression may find means to lay upon them; they will then first find the benefit of this new law, since they may, by the use of those liquors which are indulged them, put a speedy end to that life which they made unable to support.

The means by which the expenses of our present designs are to be supported, such means, my lords, as were never yet practised by any state, however exhausted, or however endangered, means which a wise nation would scarcely use to repel an invader from the capital, or to raise works to keep off a general inundation, raise yet stronger motions of indignation, when it is considered for what designs these expenses are required.

We are now, my lords, raising armies, and hiring auxiliaries, for an expedition of which no necessity can be discovered, and from which neither honour nor advantage can be expected; we are about to force from the people the last remains of their property, and to harass with exactions those who are already languishing with poverty; not for the preservation of our liberty, or the defence of our country, but for the support of the Pragmatick sanction, for the execution of a very unjust scheme formed by the late king, to which he purchased at different times, on different emergencies, the concurrence of other powers; but to which he failed to put the last seal of confirmation, perhaps in hopes of a male heir, and left the design, which he had so long and so industriously laboured, to be at last completed by the kindness of his allies; having, by an unsuccessful war against the Turks, exhausted his treasure, and weakened his troops.

Whether we shall now engage in this design; whether we shall, for the defence of the Pragmatick sanction, begin another war on the continent, of which the duration cannot be determined, the expense estimated, or the event foreseen; whether we shall contend at once with all the princes of the house of Bourbon, and entangle ourselves in a labyrinth of different schemes; whether we shall provoke France to interrupt our commerce, and invade our colonies, and stand without the assistance of a single ally, against those powers that lately set almost all Europe at defiance, is now to be determined by your lordships.

It can scarcely be expected, that the French will treat us only as auxiliaries, and satisfy themselves with attacking us only where they find themselves opposed by us: they will undoubtedly, my lords, consider us as principals, since they can suffer little more by declaring war against us.

These, my lords, are the dangers to be feared from the measures which we are now persuaded to pursue; but persuaded by arguments which, in my opinion, ought to have very little influence upon us, and which have not yet been able, however artfully or zealously enforced, to prevail upon the Dutch to unite with us. _

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