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A Treatise on Government, a non-fiction book by Aristotle

BOOK V - CHAPTER VII

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_ Commotions also arise in aristocracies, from there being so few
persons in power (as we have already observed they do in oligarchies,
for in this particular an aristocracy is most near an oligarchy, for
in both these states the administration of public affairs is in the
hands of a few; not that this arises from the same cause in both,
though herein they chiefly seem alike): and these will necessarily be
most likely to happen when the generality of the people are
high-spirited and think themselves equal to each other in merit; such
were those at Lacedasmon, called the Partheniae (for these were, as
well as others, descendants of citizens), who being detected in a
conspiracy against the state, were sent to found Tarentum. They will
happen also when some great men are disgraced by those who have
received higher honours than themselves, to whom they are no ways
inferior in abilities, as Lysander by the kings: or when an ambitious
man cannot get into power, as Cinadon, who, in the reign of Agesilaus,
was chief in a conspiracy against the Spartans: and also when some are
too poor and others too rich, which will most frequently happen in
time of war; as at Lacedaemon during the Messenian war, which is
proved by a poem of Tyrtaeus, [1307a] called "Eunomia;" for some
persons being reduced thereby, desired that the lands might be
divided: and also when some person of very high rank might still be
higher if he could rule alone, which seemed to be Pausanias's
intention at Lacedaemon, when he was their general in the Median war,
and Anno's at Carthage. But free states and aristocracies are mostly
destroyed from want of a fixed administration of public affairs; the
cause of which evil arises at first from want of a due mixture of the
democratic and the oligarchic parts in a free state; and in an
aristocracy from the same causes, and also from virtue not being
properly joined to power; but chiefly from the two first, I mean the
undue mixture of the democratic and oligarchic parts; for these two
are what all free states endeavour to blend together, and many of
those which we call aristocracies, in this particular these states
differ from each other, and on this account the one of them is less
stable than the other, for that state which inclines most to an
oligarchy is called an aristocracy, and that which inclines most to a
democracy is called a free state; on which account this latter is more
secure than the former, for the wider the foundation the securer the
building, and it is ever best to live where equality prevails. But the
rich, if the community gives them rank, very often endeavour to insult
and tyrannise over others. On the whole, whichever way a government
inclines, in that it will settle, each party supporting their own.
Thus a free state will become a democracy; an aristocracy an
oligarchy; or the contrary, an aristocracy may change into a democracy
(for the poor, if they think themselves injured, directly take part
with the contrary side) and a free state into an oligarchy. The only
firm state is that where every one enjoys that equality he has a right
to and fully possesses what is his own. And what I have been speaking
of happened to the Thurians; for the magistrates being elected
according to a very high census, it was altered to a lower, and they
were subdivided into more courts, but in consequence of the nobles
possessing all the land, contrary to law; the state was too much of an
oligarchy, which gave them an opportunity of encroaching greatly on
the rest of the people; but these, after they had been well inured to
war, so far got the better of their guards as to expel every one out
of the country who possessed more than he ought. Moreover, as all
aristocracies are free oligarchies, the nobles therein endeavour to
have rather too much power, as at Lace-daemon, where property is now
in the hands of a few, and the nobles have too much liberty to do as
they please and make such alliances as they please. Thus the city of
the Locrians was ruined from an alliance with Dionysius; which state
was neither a democracy nor well-tempered aristocracy. But an
aristocracy chiefly approaches to a secret change by its being
destroyed by degrees, as we [1307b] have already said of all
governments in general; and this happens from the cause of the
alteration being trifling; for whenever anything which in the least
regards the state is treated with contempt, after that something else,
and this of a little more consequence, will be more easily altered,
until the whole fabric of government is entirely subverted, which
happened in the government of Thurium; for the law being that they
should continue soldiers for five years, some young men of a martial
disposition, who were in great esteem amongst their officers,
despising those who had the management of public affairs, and
imagining they could easily accomplish their intention, first
endeavoured to abolish this law, with a view of having it lawful to
continue the same person perpetually in the military, perceiving that
the people would readily appoint them. Upon this, the magistrates who
are called counsellers first joined together with an intention to
oppose it but were afterwards induced to agree to it, from a belief
that if that law was not repealed they would permit the management of
all other public affairs to remain in their hands; but afterwards,
when they endeavoured to restrain some fresh alterations that were
making, they found that they could do nothing, for the whole form of
government was altered into a dynasty of those who first introduced
the innovations. In short, all governments are liable to be destroyed
either from within or from without; from without when they have for
their neighbour a state whose policy is contrary to theirs, and indeed
if it has great power the same thing will happen if it is not their
neighbour; of which both the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians are a
proof; for the one, when conquerors everywhere destroyed the
oligarchies; the other the democracies. These are the chief causes of
revolutions and dissensions in governments. _

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