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A Treatise on Government, a non-fiction book by Aristotle

BOOK V - CHAPTER XII

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_ Indeed an oligarchy and a tyranny are of all governments of the
shortest duration. The tyranny of Orthagoras and his family at Sicyon,
it is true, continued longer than any other: the reason for which was,
that they used their power with moderation, and were in many
particulars obedient to the laws; and, as Clisthenes was an able
general, he never fell into contempt, and by the care he took that in
many particulars his government should be popular. He is reported also
to have presented a person with a crown who adjudged the victory to
another; and some say that it is the statue of that judge which is
placed in the forum.

They say also, that Pisistratus submitted to be summoned into the
court of the Areopagites. The second that we shall mention is the
tyranny of the Cypselidse, at Corinth, which continued seventy-seven
years and six months; for Cypselus was tyrant there thirty years,
Periander forty-four, and Psammetichus, the son of Georgias, three
years; the reason for which was, that Cypselus was a popular man, and
governed without guards. Periander indeed ruled like a tyrant, but
then he was an able general. The third was that of the Pisistradidae
at Athens; but it was not continual: for Pisistratus himself was twice
expelled; so that out of thirty-three years he was only fifteen in
power, and his son eighteen; so that the whole time was thirty-three
years. Of the rest we shall mention that of Hiero, and Gelo at
Syracuse; and this did not continue long, for both their reigns were
only eighteen years; for Gelo died in the eighth year of his tyranny,
and Hiero in his tenth. Thrasybulus fell in his eleventh month, and
many other tyrannies have continued a very short time. We have now
gone through the general cases of corruption and [1316a] means of
preservation both in free states and monarchies. In Plato's Republic,
Socrates is introduced treating upon the changes which different
governments are liable to: but his discourse is faulty; for he does
not particularly mention what changes the best and first governments
are liable to; for he only assigns the general cause, of nothing being
immutable, but that in time everything will alter [***tr.: text is
unintelligible here***] he conceives that nature will then
produce bad men, who will not submit to education, and in this,
probably, he is not wrong; for it is certain that there are some
persons whom it is impossible by any education to make good men; but
why should this change be more peculiar to what he calls the
best-formed government, than to all other forms, and indeed to all
other things that exist? and in respect to his assigned time, as the
cause of the alteration of all things, we find that those which did
not begin to exist at the same time cease to be at the same time; so
that, if anything came into beginning the day before the solstice, it
must alter at the same time. Besides, why should such a form of
government be changed into the Lacedaemonian? for, in general, when
governments alter, they alter into the contrary species to what they
before were, and not into one like their former. And this reasoning
holds true of other changes; for he says, that from the Lacedaemonian
form it changes into an oligarchy, and from thence into a democracy,
and from a democracy into a tyranny: and sometimes a contrary change
takes place, as from a democracy into an oligarchy, rather than into a
monarchy. With respect to a tyranny he neither says whether there will
be any change in it; or if not, to what cause it will be owing; or if
there is, into what other state it will alter: but the reason of this
is, that a tyranny is an indeterminate government; and, according to
him, every state ought to alter into the first, and most perfect, thus
the continuity and circle would be preserved. But one tyranny often
changed into another; as at Syria, from Myron's to Clisthenes'; or
into an oligarchy, as was Antileo's at Chalcas; or into a democracy,
as was Gelo's at Syracuse; or into an aristocracy, as was Charilaus's
at Lacedsemon, and at Carthage. An oligarchy is also changed into a
tyranny; such was the rise of most of the ancient tyrannies in Sicily;
at Leontini, into the tyranny of Panaetius; at Gela, into that of
Cleander; at Rhegium into that of Anaxilaus; and the like in many
other cities. It is absurd also to suppose, that a state is changed
into an oligarchy because those who are in power are avaricious and
greedy of money, and not because those who are by far richer than
their fellow citizens think it unfair that those who have nothing
should have an equal share in the rule of the state with themselves,
who possess so much-for in many oligarchies it is not allowable to be
employed in money-getting, and there are many laws to prevent it. But
in Carthage, which is a democracy, money-getting is creditable, and
yet their form of government remains unaltered. It is also absurd to
say, that in an oligarchy there are two cities, one of the poor and
another of the rich; for why should this happen to them more than to
the Lacedaemonians, or any other state where all possess not equal
property, or where all are not equally good? for though no one member
of the community should be poorer than he was before, yet a democracy
might nevertheless change into an oligarchy; if the rich should be
more powerful than the poor, and the one too negligent, and the other
attentive: and though these changes are owing to many causes, yet he
mentions but one only, that the citizens become poor by luxury, and
paying interest-money; as if at first they were all rich, or the
greater part of them: but this is not so, but when some of those who
have the principal management of public affairs lose their fortunes,
they will endeavour to bring about a revolution; but when others do,
nothing of consequence will follow, nor when such states do alter is
there any more reason for their altering into a democracy than any
other. Besides, though some of the members of the community may not
have spent their fortunes, yet if they share not in the honours of the
state, or if they are ill-used and insulted, they will endeavour to
raise seditions, and bring about a revolution, that they may be
allowed to do as they like; which, Plato says, arises from too much
liberty. Although there are many oligarchies and democracies, yet
Socrates, when he is treating of the changes they may undergo, speaks
of them as if there was but one of each sort. _

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